South Carolina Law Review
Volume 10

Issue 3

Article 6

Spring 1958

Public Regulation of Land Use in South Carolina
Julian H. Toporek

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Julian H. Toporek, Public Regulation of Land Use in South Carolina, 10 S.C.L.R. 485. (1958).

This Note is brought to you by the Law Reviews and Journals at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in South Carolina Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholar Commons. For more information, please
contact digres@mailbox.sc.edu.

Toporek: Public Regulation of Land Use in South Carolina

PUBLIC REGULATION OF LAND USE
IN SOUTH CAROLINA
Scarcely more than thirty years ago, the United States
Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Sutherland in Vill-.
age of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Company,' upheld for the first
time the right of a municipality to promulgate and enforce
a comprehensive plan for the exclusion of buildings devoted
to business from a residential area. In doing so, the court
affirmed the stated belief of many state courts of last resort
that such exclusion bore a rational relation to the health and
safety of the community and was therefore within the police
2
power of the town.

Such a decision was clearly inevitable. Since the dawn of
civilization man has sought through various means to adjust
and reconcile his needs with those of his neighbor. In the
area of land use in this country, the problem has been a difficult one.3 Various means have been employed in an effort to
solve it satisfactorily. The judicial branch of our government
has attempted a solution through the doctrine of nuisance. 4
A further attempt has been made through private agreements
or covenants 5 which the courts will uphold so long as they do
not transgress established legal rights.
Although both of the foregoing methods for the regulation
of land use are still being utilized, it soon became apparent
with increased urbanization and the complexities which accompanied it, that a new and better type was needed. Out of

this need grew a field of law which is comparatively new in
America, and by which the legislature and its subdivisions
seek through the police power and eminent domain to create
a workable formula for adjusting the varying needs of the
diverse land users. The concept that this function is a proper
one for the legislature is as old as the Romans themselves,
1. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U. S. 365 (1926).
2. As to characteristics of the police power generally, see the following: State v. Berlin, 21 S. C. 292 (1883); Goodale v. Sowell, 62 S. C.
516, 40 S. E. 970 (1902); Huffman v. Columbia, 146 S. C. 436, 144 S. E.
157 (1928) ; Rock Hill v. Cothran, 209 S. C. 357, 40 S. E. 2d 239 (1947);
Sammons v. Beaufort, 225 S. C. 490, 83 S. E. 2d 153 (1954).
3. See the interesting discussion of Justice Sutherland in Village of
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., note 1, supra,at page 388.
4. 39 AM. Jun., Nuisances §1 (1942).
5. 14 Am. Jun., Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions §§ 1, 4 (1938).
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and yet it had a late start in this country because of the
reluctance of the courts to accept it.6
Just as one would be correct in his statement that this area
of the law is a relatively new one in this country, he would
be justified in saying that it still is in the fetus stage in South
Carolina. Until recent years we have been a primarily rural
state, and problems seldom arose that could not be settled
through the doctrine of nuisance and the use of covenants between the land owners themselves. But such is no longer the
case, and as we have been swept along in the tide of urbanization, our legislature has found it necessary to play an increasingly important role in this drama.
It is with these thoughts in mind that the writer has embarked upon the task of assembling those principles which
have been made applicable by statute or decision. The purpose
of this article is twofold; first, to discuss the pertinent cases
with a view toward delineating the basic principles followed
in this state where such principles have been laid down, and
second, to call to the reader's attention decisions from other
jurisdictions on matters which possibly will arise in the near
future in this state. In doing so, our discussion will necessarily be limited to those cases involving direct action by the
state or its subdivision in a legislative capacity, with only
incidental reference, where necessary, to the other modes of
land control.
ZONING
Zoning consists of a general plan to control and direct the
use and development of property in a municipality or a large
part of it by dividing it into districts according to the present
and potential use of the properties.7 The power to zone has
as its basis the police power which has been conferred upon
all city and town councils in this state by statute," and it is
legislative rather than judicial in character. 9
In our approach to the principles governing zoning, a likely
starting point would be a discussion of the various land uses
which our court has deemed to be apt subjects of legislation
6. 1 YOKLEY, ZONING LAW AND PRAcTIcE 3 (2d ed. 1953).
7. Devaney v. New Haven Board of Zoning Appeals, 132 Conn. 537,
45 A. 2d 828 (1946).
S. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 §47-61.
9. Dunbar v. Spartanburg,226 S. C. 360, 85 S. E. 2d 281 (1954).
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designed to regulate such use. In the important case of
Douglass v. Greenville,'0 our Supreme Court upheld the right
of the Greenville City Council to prohibit the erection of a
stable within its city limits. Plaintiff had purchased a lot
within the city limits with the intention of erecting a stable
thereon. An ordinance was subsequently passed prohibiting
such establishments, and plaintiff sought a writ of mandamus
to compel the issuance of a permit which had been refused
to him because the construction was opposed to the new ordinance. In denying the writ, the court held that the livery
stable was a proper subject of such prohibition, because the
health of the people was directly affected.
Likewise, a town council need not distinguish between a
billiard hall which is operated in a boisterous manner so as to
amount to a nuisance, and those which for all intents and
purposes are operated in a peaceable manner." The council
has the power to forbid the operation of all such establishments within its boundaries if it deems such action necessary.1 2 The rationale of such holdings is that poolrooms are
fraught with some danger to the morals of those who play,
even when the playing is done under the most favorable
conditions.' 3
One of the earliest land uses which our court decided was a
proper subject of regulatory legislation was the keeping of
livestock within the town limits. In Town of Brunson v. Youmanns,14 the absolute prohibition of all hogs from the territorial limits of the town was declared valid, and in the subsequent case of Ward v. Darlington,15 an ordinance which
regulated the keeping of cattle in the town proper to such an
extent as to make the cost prohibitive was similarly upheld.
The court declared that the power of the legislature was
broader where the health of the community is concerned than
it is in most areas. After the holding in the Youmanns case,
supra, that the town could prohibit livestock, the result
10. 92 S. C. 374, 75 S. E. 687 (1912).
11. Fowler v. City of Anderson, 131 S. C. 473, 128 S. E. 410 (1925).
12. However, a municipality may not declare a particular church to be
a nuisance by a mere resolution, though it has the power to do so by an
ordinance, duly enacted. Morison v. Rawlinson, 193 S. C. 25, 7 S. E. 2d
635 (1940).
13. Thomas v. Foster, 108 S. C. 98, 93 S. E. 397 (1917).
14. 76 S.C. 128, 56 S.E. 651 (1907).
15. 183 S. C. 263, 190 S. E. 826 (1937).

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

3

QUARTERLY
CAROLINA
LAW Vol.
SOUTH
South Carolina
Law Review,
10, Iss. 3 [2020],[Vol.
Art. 6 10

reached in the Ward case, supra, was a natural consequence
since the greater power includes the lesser.
The court also has been prone to approve of ordinances
which seek to further the welfare of the community through
restrictions which do not bear directly on the health of the
citizenry. A use may be excluded from a residential area even
when the only objection to it is a legislative finding that such
businesses have a tendency to have a demoralizing effect on
the surrounding landowners. For example, a funeral home
may be found to have such effect. A zoning ordinance of the
City of Charleston was drawn in question when an adjoining
property owner sought to enjoin the operation of such an
establishment.1 The permitted uses were, in addition to those
allowed in the more restrictive "A" district, two-family dwellings; multiple dwellings; fraternity, sorority or club houses;
and hotels or their incidents. The court said that aside from
any question of nuisance, 17 the violation of a valid zoning
ordinance gave rise to a cause of action in favor of a property
owner who has been or will be specially damaged if continuance of the non-conforming use is allowed. The argument that
an ordinance dividing the city into use districts according to
a general scheme was invalid was curtly dismissed as having
long since been settled in this country. The majority of the
court felt that the depression caused by being constantly reminded of death justified such an ordinance, and that any
land owner who was or would be thusly affected had suffered
sufficient special damage as would allow maintenance of an
action to enjoin its further continuance.
In Schloss Poster Advertising Company v. Rock Hill,'8
where an ordinance required a permit for the erection of a
billboard in town, 19 the court intimated that such ordinance
would be enforced as a zoning ordinance if proper standards
had been included for the guidance of the responsible city
16. Momier v. John lMcAlister, Inc., 203 S. C. 353, 27 S. E. 2d 504

(1943).

17. A municipality may also declare a funeral home a nuisance due to
its depressing effect alone, and abate that nuisance. Fraser v. Fred
Parker Funeral Home, 201 S. C. 88, 21 S. E. 2d 577 (1941).
18. 190 S. C. 92, 2 S. E. 2d 392 (1939).

19. "Hereafter it shall be unlawful to erect or maintain any billboard facing on any public street or other public place within the incor-

porate limits of the City of Rock Hill without having first obtained from
the city council a permit to do so." Schloss Poster Advertising Co. v.
Rock Hill, note 18 supra, at 93.
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authority in its administration. The plaintiff had applied for
a permit pursuant to the ordinance, and it was denied. The
Supreme Court granted a writ of mandamus compelling the
issuance of the permit upon the grounds that the ordinance
did not prescribe what factors should be taken into consideration in granting or denying the requests of the applicants,
but rather, in the words of the court, "... leaves the right of
property subject to the despotic will of city authorities who
may exercise it so as to give exclusive profits or privileges to
particular persons. ' 20 In addition, the court had this to say:
"We are of the opinion that the ordinance in its present form
is objectionable and invalid for the reasons indicated, and

cannot be enforced. If another ordinance should be enacted
we must presume that the municipal authorities will in their
wisdom enact a proper and reasonable ordinance, in conformity with the views herein expressed." [Italics added.]
This language, when coupled with testimony by the defendant city to the effect that one of the primary objectives
in the enactment of this ordinance was to prevent unsightliness, seems strongly to indicate that aesthetic considerations
may properly form one of the bases for a valid zoning ordinance. However, this case should not be construed as a holding on this point. Certainly there is not yet a holding in this
state as to whether or not aesthetic considerations may form
the sole basis for a zoning ordinance.
The general rule appears to be that aesthetic considerations
are proper auxiliary considerations in enacting an ordinance
prohibiting billboards, but that a city may not prohibit a billboard merely because it is unsightly, 2 1 though there may be
a tendency to allow such prohibitions in the future.22 It might
be well to add that the courts have taken the same view in
regard to the general exercise of the police power for aesthetic
23
reasons.
In a recent case, 24 a permit for the erection of a motel was
denied on the grounds that such use was not allowed in the
20. Accord, State v. Leonhard, 99 Ohio St. 163, 124 N. E. 187 (1919).
21. General Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Indianapolis, 202 Ind. 85, 172
N. E. 309 (1930); State v. Whitlock, 149 N. C. 542, 63 S. E. 123, 128
Am. St. Rep. 670, 16 Ann. Gas. 765 (1908).

22. See Annot., 72 A. L. R. 465; also 156 A. L. R. 581.
23. See Armot., 8 A. L. R. 2d 963.
24. Purdy v. Moise, 223 S. C. 298, 75 S. E. 2d 605 (1953).
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district involved under the city's zoning ordinance. 25 The
ordinance allowed hotels, and our court held on appeal that
the term "hotels" should be construed as including motels.
Terms limiting the use of property must be liberally construed
for the benefit of the property owner. The court also laid
stress on the fact that the city's board of adjustment had
previously allowed the construction of a motel in a similarly
restricted area on the opposite end of the town.
In addition to the foregoing land uses, our court has upheld
the right of the legislature and the various municipalities to
enact statutes and ordinances controlling activities in connection with the occupancy of land which may be called land uses
only in the broadest sense of the term. Since the scope of this
article is limited, it would best serve our purposes to make
only casual mention of these. Included under this classification are cases involving the right of a municipality to require
the owners of low-lying lands to fill or drain them, 26 to allow
27
city firemen to destroy buildings in the path of a fire, to

prescribe building materials for the prevention of fire,28 to
limit the maximum quantity of land which may be cultivated
within the city limits,2 0 and to regulate the sale of intoxicating liquors. 39 On the other hand, the court has held invalid
an ordinance requiring all residents to purchase water from
the municipality, where the municipality is shown to be un31
able to furnish certain residents such water.
REQUIREMENT OF REASONABLENESS

The courts in this state previously adhered to the view that
once conceding the power of the legislature to enact an ordinance, the courts could not inquire into its reasonableness.3 2
This view was modified in subsequent decisions which held
25. "II (A) Use Regulations: In the residence district no buildings
or land shall be used, and no building shall be hereafter erected or structurally altered, unless otherwise provided in this ordinance, except in
the following uses: .

.

. (2) Boarding houses, lodging houses, hotels not

involving the conduct of any business other than for the sole convenience
of the guests thereof.. ." Purdy v. Moise, note 24 supra, at 299, 300.
26. Charleston v. Werner, 38 S. C. 488, 17 S. E. 33 (1893).
27. White v. City Council, 2 Hill 571 (S. C. 1835).
28. Seneca v. Cochran, 84 S. C. 279, 66 S. E. 288 (1909).
29. Town Council v. Pressley, 33 S. C. 56, 11 S. E. 545, 26 Am. St. Rep.
659, 8 L. R.A. 854 (1890).
30. City Council v. Ahrens, 4 Strob. 241 (S. C. 1850).

31. DeTreville v. Grover, 219 S. C.313, 65 S. E. 2d 232 (1951).
32. See, e. g., Town Council v. Pressley, note 29, supra.
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that though an ordinance could not be attacked solely on the
ground of unreasonableness, it was a factor to be considered
in determining its constitutionality.3 3 This modification inevitably led to the conclusion reached in Columbia v. Alexander8 4 that an ordinance may be declared void solely on the
ground that it is unreasonable. Clearly the court today has
the power to invalidate any ordinance which upon judicial
determination is found to be unreasonable. 5 But it is said
that the party assailing the validity of the ordinance must
sustain the burden of proving its unreasonableness. 36 This
proof must be beyond a reasonable doubt,37 and the court has
said: "It should be added that the power to declare an ordinance invalid because it is so unreasonable as to impair or
destroy constitutional rights is one which will be exercised
carefully and cautiously, as it is not the function of the courts
to pass upon the wisdom or expediency of municipal ordinances or regulations."3 8
This power of the court is twofold. That is to say, an ordinance is subject to the scrutiny of the court as to the reasonableness of the ordinance in relation to the subject matter
which it attempts to regulate, and in addition, as to the manner in which it purports to enforce that regulation. Falling
under the former heading are the cases generally referred to
as "spot zoning." In approaching this area of the law it would
be beneficial to note the statement of a leading authority on
the law of zoning, E. C. Yokley, in regard to which cases
should properly be grouped under this heading :39
Cases become "spot zoning" cases where obviously a
particularly small lot or parcel of ground is singled out
and placed in an area, the use of which is inconsistent
with the small lot or area so placed and whose classification is changed in the ordinance, and in these cases where
special benefits are sought to be conferred on a particular
property owner, or special burdens sought to be imposed
33. State ex. rel. Southern Ry. v. Earle, 66 S. C. 194, 44 S. E. 781

(1903); Town of Brunson v. Youmanns, 76 S. C. 128, 56 S. E. 651
(1907) ; Kirk v. Board of Health, 83 S. C. 372, 65 S. E. 387, 23 L. R. A.

(N. S.) 1188 (1909).
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

125 S. C.530, 119 S.E. 241 (1923).
Henderson v. Greenwood, 172 S.C. 16, 172 S.E. 689 (1934).
See note 13, supra.
See note 39, infra.
See note 31, supra.
39. 1 YOxLEY, ZONING LAW AND PnAcTrio 209 (2d ed. 1953).
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upon particular property owners, these and these alone,
in our way of thinking, become the real "spot zone"
amendments, and they alone constitute the cases that
sabotage the laudable efforts of progressive municipal
authorities to comprehensively zone the municipalities
and drag into the dust such praiseworthy undertakings.
There is no dispute as to the fact that a "spot zone" regulation is an improper exercise of the police power. Once a
regulation has been classified by the courts as such an
attempt, it will be struck down. There is but one case directly
in point in this state. That this is the case is indeed a credit
to the integrity of the various state and municipal authorities;
for many jurisdictions are virtually swamped with such
cases, 40 notwithstanding the fact that they represent a distinct abuse of the legislative power and are designed to
further some selfish motive of a minority. A landmark case
in the law of this state is that of James v. GreenviUe,4 1 in
which an ordinance of the City of Greenville received the
rather dubious distinction of being the first to bear the onerous label of a "spot zone" amendment. There have been other
cases in South Carolina which might have been decided as
"spot zone" cases, but in each instance our court has rested
42
the decision on other equally plausible grounds.
In the James case, supra, plaintiff began operation of a
trailer camp outside of the city limits of Greenville. The city
annexed the area in which plaintiff's land was located in 1947.
In 1950 the ordinance was enacted designating plaintiff's
land as "A" district, the most restrictive classification provided for under the general scheme of zoning in Greenville.
This "A" district was composed of plaintiff's land, and a
small adjoining lot. The area adjacent was zoned as "E" district, which was considerably less restrictive. Plaintiff was
informed that all non-conforming use would have to be ceased
within a year of the date of passage of the ordinance. It was
from this notification and order, and the subsequent affirmance of these by the Master for Greenville County, that plaintiff appealed to the Supreme Court. The order was reversed,
the couit holding that the ordinance was an unconstitutional
40. Id. at 210.

41. 227 S. C. 565, 88 S. E. 2d 661 (1955).
42. Fincher v. Union, 186 S. C. 232, 196 S. E. 1 (1938); Painter v.
Forest Acres, 231 S. C. 56, 97 S. E. 2d 71 (1957).
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exercise of the police power as applied to this particular locus,
in that it bore no relation to the promotion of public health,
safety, morals or welfare. Chief Justice Baker, in his concurring opinion, was most vigorous in condemning this act. In
commenting on the proximity of the "A" district to the "E"
district, the Chief Justice said: "It is hard to tell the distance
a frog will jump from where it sits." This quotation points up
the arbitrary manner in which the ordinance was enacted,
without regard for the well-recognized principles applicable
to such legislation. It is to be hoped that the court shall never
4
again be faced with another such ordinance.

Though not specifically denominating it as a "spot zone"
ordinance, the court declared an ordinance of the City of
Union to be unreasonable in its application to the particular
land in question. In Fincher v. Union,44 plaintiff operated a
barbecue stand in what was to all appearances a business
area. The city enacted an ordinance making it unlawful for
a barbecue stand in a residential area to stay open between
the hours of 11 P.M. and 6 A.M., except on Saturdays when
they were allowed to remain open until 12 A.M. The ordinance
defined a "residential area" as "... . any section of the City of
Union where two or more houses, used for residential purposes, are located on abutting property." The court, again
speaking through Chief Justice Baker, declared the ordinance
unreasonable in its application to plaintiff as depriving him
of the use of his property without due process of law. The
definition of a "residential area" was declared unconstitutional due to its obvious unreasonableness. The court pointed
out that had the plaintiff's business been located a few doors
away it would not have fallen into the restricted class. This
43. In the most recent case in which the "spot zone" argument was
raised, our court found no basis for holding the amendment involved to
be such an abuse of the legislative power. An injunction had previously
been issued to prevent the operation of a funeral home in an area zoned
as a "B" residence district in which businesses were forbidden (see note
16, supra). The Charleston City Council subsequently passed an amendment allowing the use of a funeral home on a certain lot in the aforementioned area, and the lot had been cleared and readied for construction. It was held that since the nature of the area had so radically
changed that it was no longer suited as a strictly residential zone, the
amendment was reasonable and therefore did not constitute "spot zoning." The fact that the whole area was not re-zoned, but rather that
only one lot within the area was so treated, was held to be of no consequence, since under the facts of the case it did not appear that such
action was taken in an arbitrary manner. Momier v. John McAlister,
Inc., 231 S. C. 526, 99 S. E. 2d 177 (1957).
44. See note 42, supra.
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seems strongly to indicate that the case has all of the requisites of a "spot zone" case and could have been placed on
those grounds.
A recent case on this matter arose in Forest Acres, 45 and
the facts there closely parallel those of the Finchercase, supra.
Plaintiff operated a drive-in restaurant located within one of
four districts which were zoned to allow businesses. The town
council enacted an amendatory ordinance, declaring it unlawful for any business to be operated after 12 A.M. Plaintiff
sought and was granted an injunction, and on appeal this was
affirmed. The ordinance was adjudged to be an invalid exercise of the police power. The decision was based on the arbitrary effect to all business, and also on the premise that the
ordinance was obviously aimed at the plaintiff.46 The court
pointed out that a municipality cannot make a business a nuisance by a mere declaration that it is such.
Falling into the second class of cases which the court will
declare invalid on the basis of unreasonableness are those
which involve ordinances requiring permits in order to put
land to a given use and the ordinance does not provide sufficient criteria for the determination by the administrative
body of whether or not to issue the permit. The use sought to
be regulated may or may not be reasonable, but the ordinance
is struck down because there is too much discretion left with
the city official, and therefore the ordinance may be used as
a means of discrimination.
In Henderson v. Greenwood,47 petitioner had received a
permit for the erection of a building on her lot, which lot was
within two hundred feet of a railroad track. Acting pursuant
to complaints from adjoining property owners, the council
revoked the permit and enacted an ordinance which flatly
forbade the erection of any building within two hundred feet
of a railroad track without first obtaining permission through
a resolution of the council. In seeking a writ of mandamus,
Mrs. Henderson assailed the ordinance on the grounds that
it was so unreasonable and discriminatory as to amount to a
taking of private property without due process of law in contravention to those rights guaranteed by the constitution of
45. See note 42, sura.
46. Cf., DeTreville v. Groover, note 31, supra.
47. 172 S. C. 16, 172 S. E. 689 (1934).
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this state.48 In upholding this contention, the court stated
it felt the purpose of the ordinance was to deprive Mrs. Henderson of all profitable use of the land. The ordinance was
said to be unreasonable in that it provided no standards for
the granting or withholding of permits. An actual taking of
the land was not necessary as a prerequisite for granting relief under a prior South Carolina decision.4 9 It is enough that
the act interferes with the legal use and enjoyment of the
property.
In the Schloss case, 50 such an ordinance was drawn in issue.
It provided that anyone desiring to erect a billboard on a
public street must first acquire a permit, but failed to state
on what grounds such a permit should or should not be
granted. In striking the ordinance down, the court in effect
stated that such an act left property rights subject to the
arbitrary will of a public official. One should remember that
the manner in which the ordinance is actually enforced is not
the material issue in such a case; the real issue is whether or
not, in the eyes of the law, the ordinance sufficiently prescribes criteria for the guidance of the officials who act
pursuant to it.
REVOCATION OF A VALIDLY ISSUED PERMIT
There is no longer any dispute as to the right of a municipality to require a construction or use permit. It is also recognized that the applicant may be required to show compliance
with existing restrictions as a prerequisite to the issuance of
such a permit, and also that a permit may be withheld for

cause. 51 But a permit may not be wrongfully withheld.5 2 Once

a valid permit has been issued, the municipality may revoke
it upon a showing of cause.5 3 However, if the permittee has
acted in good faith in incurring expenses of contractual obligations in reliance on the permit, there will arise in him a
property right which will insure him against revocation of
the permit.5 4 At least two South Carolina cases have recog48. S. C. CONST. Art. I, §5.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Gasque v. Conway, 194 S. C. 15, 8 S.E. 2d 871 (1940).
See note 14, supra.
Pendarvis v. Orangeburg, 157 S. C. 496, 154 S. E. 756 (1930).
State v. Kreuzweiser, 120 Ohio St. 352, 166 N. E. 228 (1929).

53. Howe Realty Co. v. Nashville, 176 Tenn. 405, 141 S. W. 2d 004
(1940).
54. 43 C. J., Municipal Corporations §380 (1927).
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nized the principle that such a right, commonly called a
"vested right," will arise under the proper circumstances. 55
However, the permittee must have acted in good faith,56 and
the official issuing the permit may not do so in contravention
to the ordinance he is acting under, for he does not have the
power to sanction what the legislature has declared to be
57
illegal.
VARIANCE

It has long been settled in other jurisdictions that a provision of a zoning ordinance to the effect that the specified
board may, upon a hearing, grant relief from the restriction
imposed upon the petitioner's land, when a proper showing of

need is made, is valid."8 Such a provision has never been
directly challenged in this state, but undoubtedly it would be
upheld if challenged.
The important consideration in studying variances can best
be stated in the form of a question, to wit: When has the
petitioner made a sufficient showing of hardship so as to
justify granting him relief? There have only been four cases
bearing on this matter in our state. However, all have arisen
since 1952, so it appears quite likely that a great many more
will follow, and therefore the topic merits our consideration.
In the first of these cases,5 9 the issues usually presented in
a variance case were not squarely decided on by the court, and
were only incidentally present. Plaintiff owned a lot in Myrtle
Beach on which he operated a motor court. Such use was
permitted in the "R-4" district in which the lot was situate.
The dispute arose over a contiguous lot also owned by plaintiff and which was located across the street from the first
mentioned lot, but in an "R-1" district, in which a restaurant
was not permitted. A petition was filed with the adjustment
board for a variance to allow the plaintiff to operate a restaurant on the second lot. The plaintiff argued on the theory that
the ordinance was invalid as applied to the lot in question, in
55. Willis v. Town of Woodruff, 200 S. C. 266, 20 S. E. 2d 699 (1924);

Pendleton v. Columbia, 209 S. C. 394, 40 S. E. 2d 499 (1946).
56. Aberman v. New Kensington, 377 Pa. 520, 105 A. 2d 586 (1954).
57. Cochran v. Roemer, 287 Mass. 500, 192 N. E. 58 (1934) ; Ventresca
v. Exley, 358 Pa. 98, 56 A. 2d 210 (1948).

58. See Annot., 168 A. L. R. 13.

59. Talbot v. Myrtle Beach Bd. of Adjustment, 222 S. C. 165, 72 S. E.

2d 66 (1952).
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that it became so unreasonable as to amount to a deprivation
of property without due process of law and therefore unconstitutional. The court had little trouble in disposing of this
argument and dismissed the petition. This contention was
mainly along the lines of those made in the cases involving
"spot zoning," and does not rightly apply to a case such as
this. This will be more clearly shown as we examine the later
cases in this state.
In the next case confronting the court, the issues of variance were more squarely presented. 60 Here the plaintiffs were
radiologists, and sought relief from a building restriction
which prevented the construction of any building within six
feet of the side yard. The plaintiffs used a great deal of
equipment in their work, and this required certain installation in order to be effective. The plaintiffs contended that
such installation called for so much room that they would be
forced to use more than the allotted space and that the building would extend more than six feet into the side yard. To
deny them the privilege of so constructing their building
would amount to an "unnecessary hardship" in their opinion.
In denying the variance our Supreme Court said: "It is generally held that before a variance can be allowed on the ground
of 'unnecessary hardship' there must at least be proof that
a particular property suffers a singular disadvantage through
the operation of a zoning regulation."
On the basis of the evidence presented, the court felt that
all that had been shown here was inconvenience. This was
based on a lack of a strong enough showing of essentials. In
the words of the court, "There is no showing that the side
yard requirement, when applied to respondents' property, becomes arbitrary, confiscatory, or unduly oppressive because
of conditions of the property distinguishing it from other
properties similarly restricted."
Thus the court laid down the principle that so long as the
ordinance is valid and applies equally to all within a given
class, a mere showing of hardship will not warrant relief;
there must be a hardship suffered which is peculiar to this
land. It was not stated just what would constitute such a
showing. The evidence presented by the petitioner tended to
prove that the zoning restriction would prevent petitioners
60. Hodge v. Polluck, 223 S. C. 342, 75 S. E. 2d 752 (1953).
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from installing their X-ray equipment in the best feasible
manner. However, it did not show that they would be prevented from making an installation in the only feasible way.
Perhaps if such a showing had been made, the court would
have been less reluctant to grant the petitioners' demands. A
close examination of the opinion would seem to justify such
a conclusion.
The subsequent case of Simmons v. Board of Adjustment
of Charleston"' throws considerable light on the problem.
Several issues were raised here which were lacking in the two
previous decisions. The petitioners were the lessor and lessee
of a parcel of land situate along the river front in Charleston.
They sought relief from a zoning regulation which had placed
their land in a "B" district, in which restaurants were not
allowed. The validity of the ordinance was not questioned.
After a variance had been granted, several adjoining landowners appealed to the Supreme Court on the grounds that
the grant of such a variance would considerably decrease the
value of their land, which had been purchased in reliance on
the then existing regulations. Charleston Lobster House, Inc.
had leased the land in question from the State Ports Authority
with a view in mind of constructing an expensive restaurant.
A clause in the deed provided that there would be a mutual
release of all contractual obligations in the event the lessees
were unable to promulgate their plans due to any restrictions
imposed on the land by the city. A majority of the court felt
that the variance should not have been granted. It was felt
that since the lessees had agreed to lease the land with full
knowledge of the use limitations then in effect against it, and
since they had shown nothing but financial hardship, the burden of proving "unnecessary hardship" had not been sustained. The court flatly stated that in its opinion, the lessees
would suffer no actual present loss because of the aforementioned clause in the lease. But the court went on to say that
granting they did suffer such a loss, still they had not made
a sufficient showing of hardship. One reason advanced for
this proposition was that they had entered into the lease at
their peril, and could not now be heard to complain.
The lessees also tried to prove hardship by the fact that
there was no other property as suitable for their purposes
61. 226 S. C. 459, 85 S. E. 2d 708 (1955).
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available, and that denial of the variance would result directly

in the loss of income and profit. This the court refused to consider on the grounds that it was at best speculative.0 2 Several
principles may be derived from this case, some of which were
not heretofore present in the law of this state: (1) In seeking
a variance, the burden of proving that the ordinance is unreasonable as applied to the petitioner's land is on the petitioner, the presumption being that the ordinance is reasonable
in its application to all land; (2) to sustain this burden, there
must be a showing of "unnecessary hardship," and a mere
showing of financial loss will not be deemed adequate; however, in a proper case, evidence of financial loss is relevant as
bearing on the issue of "unnecessary hardship ;" (3) the land
must suffer a hardship as a result of the application to it of
the ordinance, and this hardship must not only be different
in quantity from that suffered by other land similarly situate,
but must also differ in quatlity; 63 (4) the possible loss of
future income or profit is merely speculative and may not be
used as evidence of hardship; (5) a variance will not be
granted if it is not in harmony with the spirit and general
scheme of the ordinance.
The most recent decision relevant to this topic also arose
in Charleston. 4 The facts briefly are these: The First Baptist
Church, hereafter referred to as the church, owned land located in an "A" district on which they had maintained a house
of worship for many years before the advent of zoning regulations in Charleston. When the land was zoned, churches were
a permitted use. The church also maintained a Sunday School
building on the premises, and when they contemplated an
addition to this, they ran afoul of a regulation limiting the
percentage of any lot in the "A" district on which a "principal
building" could be erected. The church sought and obtained
a variance, but the board attached a proviso to the effect that
the school should not house more than 270 students at any
time. This was deemed necessary for two reasons. First, the
church planned to use the building for a day school, which
meant that it would be in use every day. Second, a traffic congestion was encountered when the church transported the
62. Contra, id. at 467 (dissenting opinion).
63. It is interesting to note that this test has proved unsatisfactory in
the area of nuisance. PRossER, TORTS, p. 404 (2d ed. 1955).
64. Stevenson v. Bd. of Adjustment of Charleston, 230 S. C. 440, 96
S. E. 2d 456 (1957).
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pupils from the school to the city playground which was used
for recreation in lieu of their own facilities, this playground
being some three blocks from the school. Adjoining property
owners appealed the variance, and the church appealed the
proviso. The lower court upheld the variance, but at the same
time struck the proviso as unreasonable. Both parties again
appealed this decision. The issues clearly presented on this
appeal were: (a) Was there a sufficient showing of "unnecessary hardship" to justify a variance? (b) If so, was the
proviso appended to the order granting the variance a proper
limitation?
Although other issues were involved, we are not concerned
with them here. The first of the major issues was that of the
variance, the opinion of the court being that this had been
properly granted. The church had suffered a singular disadvantage through the operation of this regulation. This finding was based upon a belief that the evidence brought forth
by the church as to increased enrollment and lack of other
available space had sustained the burden of showing "unnecessary hardship" according to the principles already outlined.
The right of the board of adjustment to attach a proviso to
an order granting a variance had not heretofore been challenged in this state, and was attacked only on the grounds of
reasonableness in this case. The court met this argument by
reference to the code section0 5 and the ordinance section6 6
authorizing "reasonable and additional stipulations" by the
board in granting the variance, and concluded that the proviso
here was reasonable and therefore valid. Conceivably the code
section and the ordinance section might both have been attacked on the grounds that they constituted an unconstitutional delegation of legislative powers. However, in other
jurisdictions such provisions have generally been upheld. 67
OTHER RELATED AREAS

Aside from zoning, which constitutes the main body of law
in this area, the imposition of use regulations may take other
forms. For example, other jurisdictions have recognized the
65. CODE OF LAWS Or SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 47-1007.
66. ZONING ORDINANCE OF THE CITY OF CHARLESTON, art. XI § 51 (e).
67. 1 YOKLEY, ZONING LAW AND PRACTICE 354 (2d ed. 1953).
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validity of enabling statutes which grant to the municipalities
the authority to set up minimum standards for housing under
the police power. 6s The requirements made must be reasonable
and designed to promote the public health, safety and welfare.69 South Carolina enacted such a statute in 1939,70 but
it was not until 1955 that the first and only case drawing in
issue the validity of a municipal ordinance passed pursuant to
the statute came before our Supreme Court. In Richards 'V.
Columbia,7 1 several owners of rental property in the City of
Columbia sought to enjoin enforcement of an ordinance prescribing minimum standards which must be met. 72 The ordinance was assailed as unconstitutional on the grounds that
it was confiscatory, impaired the obligation of contract, constituted an unlawful delegation of legislative power, violated
constitutional provisions against unlawful searches and seizures, and deprived plaintiff of due process of law. In rejecting
these contentions the court, speaking through Justice Stukes,
said: "We conclude that the ordinance, as herein restricted, is

not an arbitrary or unreasonable exercise of the police power;
and that it is not subject to the constitutional objections
which have been earnestly and ably argued in behalf of
appellants ...."
However, of significance is the fact that this was a threetwo decision. The dissent was based on the unreasonableness
of subdivisions (a) through (g) of Section Nine 7 3 of the ordinance. This section prescribed the various conditions essential
to a finding that a dwelling is fit for habitation. The entire
court agreed that the preamble to Section Nine of the ordinance 7 4 was an invalid delegation of the legislative power and
was therefore void. However, two justices felt that even after
68. 9 AM. JUR., Buildings § 3 (1937).

69. 12 AM. JUR., ConstitutionalLaw § 686 (1938).
70. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952

71.
72.
73.
74.

§§

36-501 through 36-511.

227 S. C. 538, 88 S. E. 2d 683 (1955).
Id. at 543.
Id. at 545.
"Sec. 9. Standards of Dwellings or Dwelling Units Fit for Human

Habitation. The commission and/or the Rehabilitation Director may determine that a dwelling or dwelling unit is unfit for human habitation

if conditions existing in such a dwelling or dwelling unit are dangerous
or injurious to the health, safety or morals of the occupants of such
dwelling or dwelling unit, the occupants of neighboring dwellings or
other residents of the city. Without limiting the generality of the foregoing, the following conditions are hereby declared to be essential to

make a dwelling fit for human habitation." For list of essentials, see
227 S. C. at 545.
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striking that provision, the requirements of the ordinance
were so stringent that they were unreasonable. Thus the inference might well be drawn that if the same question were
to again come before the court, they might modify or even
reverse themselves.
The final area within the scope of this article is that of
slum clearance, or, as it is more technically called, urban
redevelopment. Since this topic is but incidentally related to
our main field, only the highlights and more important aspects
will be mentioned. This is a new area of case law in South
Carolina, there being very few cases thus far. However, the
obvious communal benefits strongly suggest that in the immediate future many more municipalities will follow those
who have already enacted ordinances, and with these enactments litigation also will increase.
There are two statutes under which ordinances are generally enacted in this state. The first, known as the State Housing Law,7 5 was enacted in 1933. In all cases challenging ordinances enacted under the authority of this statute, our court
has held that slum clearance and subsequent low-cost housing
for families within a denoted income was a proper exercise of
the police power and that of eminent domain.76 It is also said
that such plans are for a "public use" within the meaning of
Article I, Section 17, of the Constitution of 1895. 77 These
holdings are in accord with the weight of authority in this
country, and are in keeping with the principles long embedded
78
in our society.
Some courts have even gone so far as to call the use "public"
when there is an incidental private benefit derived. 79 Such a
case arose recently in this state, but the Supreme Court displayed a reluctance to go this far. 0 The Housing Authority
of the City of Columbia, acting under the Redevelopment Law
passed in 1939,81 made a legislative determination that an
75. CoD OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 §§ 36-1 through 36-61.
76. McNulty v. Owens, 188 S. C. 377, 199 S. E. 425 (1938) ; Benjamin
v. Housing Authority, 198 S. C. 79, 15 S. E. 2d 737 (1941).
77. "Private Property shall not be taken for private use without the
consent of the owner, nor for public use without just compensation being
made therefor."
78. See Annot., 172 A. L. R. 967.
79. 2 YOKLry, ZONING LAW AND PRACTICE; 26 (2d ed. 1953).
80. Edens v. Columbia, 228 S. C. 563, 91 S. E. 2d 280 (1956).
81. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 §§ 36-401 through 36-414.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol10/iss3/6

18

1958]

Toporek: Public Regulation of Land Use in South Carolina
LAW NOTES

area of the city, comprising some fourteen blocks, was
"blighted," and that there was a need to remedy it. However,
in contrast with those cases previously discussed, there was
no intention to construct low cost housing on the land after
it was condemned through eminent domain. Quite to the contrary, the Housing Authority proposed to sell two blocks of
the land to the University of South Carolina, and dispose of
the remainder to private companies for their use as sites for
light industry. Petitioner was an owner of property in the
area in question, and sought a declaratory judgment on the
constitutionality of the Redevelopment Law. For the first
time in this state, the question squarely before the court was
whether such condemnation of private property for later sale
to private concerns was a valid exercise of the power of eminent domain, and more specifically whether there was a "public use" within the meaning of Article I, Section 17 of the
Constitution of 1895, supra. The area to be sold to the University was not in dispute, as it was conceded that this was a
"public use."
The lower court found the act to be constitutional, but the
Supreme Court reversed on appeal. While cognizant of the
fact that other jurisdictions had upheld such laws, the court
felt that these decisions were not justified. The court also

pointed out that the wording of the comparable clauses of the
various constitutions differed with the states. Some were
worded "public benefit,"8 2 and others "public purpose."8 33
Much weight was placed on a recent Florida decision in which
a law similar to ours was declared void.8 4 However, the better
decisions are thought to be those which uphold such laws regardless of the wording of the particular constitutional provision involved. Our court felt that they were bound by a
recent decision construing "public use" in a very restrictive
sense, 85 and intimated that the only solution would be a constitutional amendment. Since the end result of such projects.
as that attempted in the Edens case, supra, is desirable to
most municipalities, it would appear that the legislature
would do well to consider such an amendment.
82. State v. Rich, 159 Ohio St. 13, 110 N. E. 2d 778 (1953).

83. White v. Chicago Land Clearance Commission, 411 Ill. 310, 104

N. E. 2d 236 (1952).

84. Adams v. Housing Authority, 60 So. 2d 663 (Fla. 1952).
85. Bookhart v. Central Electric Power Coop., Inc., 219 S. C. 414, 65

S. E. 2d 781 (1951).
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CONCLUSION

From the foregoing discussion it is apparent that even
though the law in this state is limited, a firm foundation has
been laid which should serve to assure us of sound decisions
on these matters as they arise in the future. Our court has
shown an extreme insight into the problems involved in this
complicated body of law, and has attempted consistently to
further the progress of the communities where it could be
done without denying to any one citizen his basic constitutional rights. Several statutes have been enacted which bestow upon municipalities the power to regulate land use in
ways differing from those previously discussed.8 6 As yet,
these have not been tested in our courts, but it is anticipated
that they will be in the near future.8 7 The attitudes displayed
by the legislature and the court insures us that the welfare of
the people is the primary consideration of both, and that as
each new principle materializes, our state will become that
much better to live in.
JULIAN H. TOPOREK

86. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 §§ 47-1021 through
47-1055; 47-1061 through 47-1094; 47-1101 through 47-1113, providing
for planning commissions for cities and towns in various population
classes, and in some instances including certain powers to regulate land
uses outside of the municipal boundaries.

87. For cases from other jurisdictions, see 1 YoKLEY, ZONING LAW
AND PRAcTICE 264 (2d ed. 1953).
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